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What Kind of Perspectivism?
Journal of Moral Philosophy ( IF 0.537 ) Pub Date : 2018-08-11 , DOI: 10.1163/17455243-20170007
Benjamin Kiesewetter 1
Affiliation  

According to perspectivism about moral obligation, our obligations are affected by our epistemic circumstances. But how exactly should this claim be understood? On Zimmerman’s “Prospective View,” perspectivism is spelled out as the thesis that an option is obligatory if and only if it maximizes what Zimmerman calls “prospective value,” which is in turn determined by the agent’s present evidence. In this article, I raise two objections to this approach. Firstly, I argue that spelling out the difference between perspectivism and anti-perspectivism in terms of value creates a number of problems that can be avoided by an account that proceeds in terms of reasons. Secondly, I argue that Zimmerman focuses on the wrong body of evidence, and that this commits him to an implausible solution to the problem that perspectivists face with regard to advice from better-informed sources.

中文翻译:

什么样的透视主义?

根据关于道德义务的透视主义,我们的义务受我们的认知环境影响。但是,究竟应该如何理解这种说法呢?在齐默尔曼的“前瞻性观点”中,透视主义被阐明为这样一种论点,即当且仅当一个选项最大化了齐默尔曼所说的“预期价值”,而后者又由代理人的现有证据决定。在本文中,我对这种方法提出了两个反对意见。首先,我认为,从价值的角度阐明透视主义和反透视主义之间的区别会产生许多问题,而这些问题可以通过从原因方面进行的说明来避免。其次,我认为齐默尔曼专注于错误的证据体系,
更新日期:2018-08-11
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