What is the relationship between justice and moral permissibility? If an action constitutes an injustice, does that decisively rule it out, morally speaking, or merely count heavily against it? This paper argues that although the injustice of an action counts heavily against performing it, this effect can sometimes be overridden by consequentialist concerns. This suggests that injustice does not conclusively rule out actions that generate it, which in turn suggests that an approach to justice that conceives of it as an object of intrinsic moral value more accurately reflects the behavior of justice than do more traditional deontological approaches.

中文翻译：

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两种正义观

正义与道德可容许性之间是什么关系？如果一项行为构成不公正，从道德上讲，这是否决定性地排除了它，或者只是严重反对它？本文认为，尽管一项行动的不公正严重影响了它的执行，但这种影响有时会被结果主义的担忧所掩盖。这表明不公正并没有最终排除产生它的行为，这反过来表明，将其视为内在道德价值对象的正义方法比更传统的道义论方法更准确地反映了正义的行为。