A largely overlooked and puzzling feature of morality is Moral Memory: apparent cases of directly memorising, remembering, and forgetting first-order moral propositions seem odd. To illustrate: consider someone apparently memorising that capital punishment is wrong, or acting as if they are remembering that euthanasia is permissible, or reporting that they have forgotten that torture is wrong. I here clarify Moral Memory and identify desiderata of good explanations. I then proceed to amend the only extant account, Bugeja’s (2016) Non-Cognitivist explanation, but show that it isn’t superior to a similar Cognitivist-friendly view, and that both explanations face a counterexample. Following this, I consider and reject a series of alternative Cognitivist-friendly explanations, suggesting that a Practicality-Character explanation that appeals to the connection between the practicality of moral attitude and character is superior. However, I conclude that support for this explanation should remain conditional and tentative.

中文翻译：

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道德记忆之谜

道德的一个在很大程度上被忽视和令人费解的特征是道德记忆：直接记忆、记住和忘记一阶道德命题的明显案例似乎很奇怪。举例说明：假设某人显然记住了死刑是错误的，或者表现得好像他们记得安乐死是允许的，或者报告说他们已经忘记了酷刑是错误的。我在这里澄清了道德记忆并确定了良好解释的必要性。然后我继续修改唯一现存的说明，Bugeja (2016) 非认知主义解释，但表明它并不优于类似的认知主义友好观点，并且这两种解释都面临反例。在此之后，我考虑并拒绝了一系列对认知主义友好的替代解释，这表明，诉诸道德态度的实用性与品格之间的联系的实用性-性格解释是优越的。然而，我得出的结论是，对这种解释的支持应该是有条件的和暂时的。