In this paper, I argue against the commonly held view that paternalism is all things considered wrong when it interferes with a person’s autonomy. I begin by noting that the plausibility of this view rests on the assumption that there is a morally relevant difference in the normative reasons concerning an intervention in a person’s self-regarding actions and an intervention in his other-regarding actions. I demonstrate that this assumption cannot be grounded by wellbeing reasons, and that autonomy-based reasons of non-interference also cannot adequately explain the difference. Following this, I propose that the difference in the reasons related to an intervention in a person’s self-regarding actions and an intervention in his other-regarding actions can be explained by the value of holding a person responsible for his choices. Nonetheless, this does not result in paternalistic behavior that interferes with autonomy being all things considered wrong. Instead, I show that the reason to hold a person responsible for a diminution of his wellbeing does not necessarily defeat the wellbeing reasons that count in favor of paternalistic behavior.

中文翻译：

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家长作风有多大错？

在本文中，我反对普遍持有的观点，即当家长作风干扰一个人的自主权时，一切都被认为是错误的。我首先指出，这种观点的合理性基于这样一个假设，即关于干预一个人的自私行为和干预他的他人行为的规范理由存在道德相关差异。我证明这个假设不能以幸福为基础，基于自主的不干涉原因也不能充分解释这种差异。在此之后，我提出，与干预一个人的自利行为和干预他的其他行为相关的原因的差异可以用让一个人为他的选择负责的价值来解释。尽管如此，这不会导致干扰自治的家长式行为被认为是错误的。相反，我表明让一个人对其幸福感的减少负责的理由并不一定会打败支持家长式行为的幸福感理由。