According to action-relative accounts of harming, an action harms someone only if it makes her worse off in some respect than she would have been, had the action not been performed. Action-relative accounts can be contrasted with effect-relative accounts, which hold that an action may harm an individual in virtue of its effects on that individual, regardless of whether the individual would have been better off in the absence of the action. In this paper, I argue that our judgments about the strength of the reason against harming lend support to effect-relative accounts over action-relative accounts. I first criticize Fiona Woollard’s argument for the claim that an effect-relative account of harming could ground only a weak reason against harming. I then argue for a set of three principles that can be conjoined with an effect-relative account to explain the strength of the reason against harming.

中文翻译：

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论反对伤害的理由的力量

根据与伤害相关的行为描述，只有当某行为使某人在某些方面比没有执行该行为时的情况更糟时，才会伤害某人。行动相关账户可以与效果相关账户形成对比，后者认为一项行动可能会因其对个人的影响而伤害个人，而不管在没有该行动的情况下个人是否会变得更好。在本文中，我认为我们对反对伤害的理由强度的判断支持效果相关账户而不是行动相关账户。我首先批评菲奥娜·伍拉德 (Fiona Woollard) 的论点，即关于伤害的效果相关说明只能作为反对伤害的微弱理由。