In this paper I argue against the charge that dependence on moral testimony is at odds with good moral agency, and moral specifically with the ideal of having moral understanding and using it to make moral judgments. My argument has four main strands. First, I contend that one of the grounds that is often adduced for the value of moral understanding—namely, that it is important for justifying ourselves to others—does not offer an adequate basis for criticizing dependence on moral testimony. Second, I show how dependence on moral testimony is not incompatible with moral understanding. Third, I argue that, in fact, dependence on moral testimony can be an important avenue for achieving moral understanding. Fourth, and finally, I contend that moral understanding is not always an ideal we have sufficient reason to seek. If my arguments are successful, they provide new resources for a defense of dependence on moral testimony.

中文翻译：

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道德见证和道德理解

在这篇论文中，我反对这样一种指控，即依赖道德证词与良好的道德能动性不一致，尤其是道德与拥有道德理解并用它来做出道德判断的理想不一致。我的论点有四个主要方面。首先，我认为，道德理解的价值经常被引用的一个理由——即，向他人证明自己是重要的——并没有为批评依赖道德证词提供充分的基础。其次，我展示了对道德证言的依赖与道德理解并不矛盾。第三，我认为，事实上，对道德证言的依赖可以成为实现道德理解的重要途径。第四，也是最后，我认为道德理解并不总是我们有充分理由去寻求的理想。如果我的论证成功，