This paper uses corruption in Mexico City's markets as a lens to examine state–society relations and the construction of the PRI's hegemony in post-1946 Mexico. It presents three case studies that show how some ostensibly corrupt practices supported state functioning, while others contributed to the process of party building. It demonstrates that these practices were driven by shifting social dynamics and conflicts among vendors, which operated through networks of formal and informal power. Historicising corruption illuminates the strengths and weaknesses of the Mexican state as well as the balance between co-optation and popular demands that lay behind it in this period.

中文翻译：

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治理业务：1946-1958 年墨西哥城市场的腐败和非正式政治

本文以墨西哥城市场的腐败为视角，考察了 1946 年后墨西哥的国家与社会关系以及 PRI 霸权的构建。它提供了三个案例研究，展示了一些表面上的腐败行为如何支持国家运作，而另一些则有助于党的建设过程。它表明，这些做法是由不断变化的社会动态和供应商之间的冲突驱动的，这些供应商通过正式和非正式的权力网络运作。历史化的腐败揭示了墨西哥国家的优势和劣势，以及这一时期背后的吸纳与民众需求之间的平衡。