Abstract We discuss a Red Team-Blue Team (RT-BT) study conducted to examine the formation and efficacy of social networks in self-organizing, ad hoc, or crowd-sourced intelligence and counter-intelligence operations in grassroots, improvised communities. Student volunteers were sorted into two teams: one team (Blue) was asked to find puzzle pieces using clues provided by the organizers, with the goal of reconstructing a message contained therein, while the opposing team (Red) was tasked with disrupting this process. While the Blue Team quickly organized into an efficient, centrally-governed structure, the Red Team instead adopted a decentralized, distributed operational network to hinder puzzle completion, using creative and diverse infiltration and disruption methods to interfere in the more centralized, hierarchical organization of their opponents. This exercise shows how untrained, unaffiliated individuals may self-organize into different types of social organizations to accomplish common tasks when aware of potential adversarial organizations, and how these choices may affect their efficacy in accomplishing collaborative clandestine goals.

中文翻译：

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即兴情报/反情报演习中的动态特设社交网络：国土安全部红队蓝队真人角色扮演

摘要我们讨论了一个红色团队-蓝色团队（RT-BT）进行的研究，以研究社交网络在草根，即兴社区的自组织，即席或基于人群的情报和反情报行动中的形成和效力。学生志愿者分为两支队伍：一支队伍（蓝色）被要求使用组织者提供的线索寻找拼图，目的是重建其中的信息，而另一支队伍（红色）则被要求破坏这一过程。蓝队迅速组织成一个高效的，由中央管理的组织，而红队却采用了分散的，分散的作战网络来阻碍拼图的完成，它使用创造性的，多样化的渗透和破坏方法来干扰更集中，对手的等级组织。此练习显示了未经培训的，没有联系的个人如何在意识到潜在的对抗组织时会自我组织成不同类型的社会组织以完成共同的任务，以及这些选择如何影响他们完成合作秘密目标的功效。