When do citizens take costly collective action against government corruption? When citizens act in concert, their demands are credible and not easily discounted by governments, which should be more likely to respond. In this study, we use the stag-hunt game, supplemented by Granovetter's threshold model of collective action, to investigate the conditions under which citizens coordinate to collectively act against government corruption. We use survey experiments in laboratory settings in Australia, Singapore, and the United States. The results show several conditions motivate participants to pursue collective action; using the wellspring of the theoretical argument, they clarify that information that others pursue collective action, together with clear mutual benefits as measured by rewards, are primary motivators of the individual's choice. Correspondingly, other considerations, including initial costs or final potential penalties, do not bear on the individual's choice. The findings have implications not only for the empirical literature on policy but also for policy debates on how to control it.

中文翻译：

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公民何时对政府腐败采取代价高昂的行动？来自澳大利亚、新加坡和美国的实验证据

公民何时对政府腐败采取代价高昂的集体行动？当公民采取一致行动时，他们的要求是可信的，不会轻易被政府忽视，政府应该更有可能做出回应。在这项研究中，我们使用猎鹿博弈，辅以 Granovetter 的集体行动阈值模型，来调查公民协调集体反对政府腐败的条件。我们在澳大利亚、新加坡和美国的实验室环境中使用调查实验。结果表明，有几个条件促使参与者采取集体行动；利用理论论证的源泉，他们澄清了其他人追求集体行动的信息，以及以奖励衡量的明确的互利，是个人选择的主要动力。相应地，其他考虑因素，包括初始成本或最终的潜在处罚，不影响个人的选择。这些发现不仅对有关政策的实证文献有影响，而且对关于如何控制它的政策辩论也有影响。