The common assumption of legislative politics is that the majority party structures procedural rules to suit its interests. In a presidentialized context, however, presidential electoral incentives prevail over majority party's incentives when voting on procedural rules changes and the threat of punishing majority-party defectors is not credible when those defectors vote with the presidential candidate. To test these claims, I analyze the case of the procedural reform in the South Korean National Assembly. The case study reveals that 1) the leading presidential candidate of the ruling majority Saenuri Party compromised on the procedural reform bill that imposes restrictions on the majority party's cartel arrangement due to presidential electoral incentives; 2) a significant number of Saenuri Party members defected from the majority of their co-partisans to vote with the presidential candidate; and 3) career advancement ratio and re-nomination ratios demonstrate that those defectors were not punished afterwards.

中文翻译：

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总统选举和程序规则的改变：以韩国国民议会为例

立法政治的普遍假设是多数党制定程序规则以适应其利益。然而，在总统制的背景下，当对程序规则进行投票时，总统选举激励优于多数党的激励，当这些叛逃者与总统候选人一起投票时，惩罚多数党叛逃者的威胁是不可信的。为了检验这些说法，我分析了韩国国民议会程序改革的案例。案例研究表明，1) 执政的多数党新世界党的主要总统候选人因总统选举激励措施，在限制多数党卡特尔安排的程序改革法案上妥协；2) 相当数量的新世界党成员从他们的大多数合作党派中叛逃到总统候选人那里投票；3) 职业晋升率和再提名率表明这些叛逃者没有在事后受到惩罚。