This article is about a puzzle: strong civilian control of the military may promote the use of force not lessen it. Existing theories about civil–military relations and militarism do not adequately resolve this puzzle because they neglect the link between civilian control and the legitimacy to use force. The argument here is that an increase in the civilian control of the military may promote the use of force by legitimizing it under specific cumulative conditions: the existence of a previous militaristic infrastructure in the civilian political culture, which is triggered by an external event, and is augmented by three mechanisms deriving from civilian control that increase the legitimacy of using force by reducing deliberative decision-making. These three mechanisms are: (1) the depoliticization of the military caused by reinforcing civilian control, so the professional opinion of the military reigns supreme; (2) the militarization by inflating threats and setting ambitious war goals to remove such threats, which balances out the aversion to sacrifice for war that civilian control produces; and (3) the transition produced by civilian control to a volunteer, technology-intensive, downsized military that reduces the stake of citizens in military policies. The plausibility of this argument is explored by reference to the cases of the United States, Israel, and Russia.

中文翻译：

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平民控制如何促进使用武力

这篇文章是一个谜：一个强大的平民对军队的控制可能会促进使用武力而不是减少武力。现有的关于军民关系和军国主义的理论未能充分解决这个难题，因为它们忽视了平民控制与使用武力的合法性之间的联系。这里的论点是，在特定的累积条件下，加强对平民的军事控制可以通过使武力合法化来促进使用武力：在民间政治文化中存在先前的军事基础设施，这是由外部事件触发的；以及民事管制衍生了三种机制，这些机制通过减少审议性决策而增加了使用武力的合法性。这三种机制是：（1）由于加强民政控制导致军队的非政治化，因此军队的专业意见占上风；（2）通过夸大威胁并设定雄心勃勃的战争目标以消除威胁来实现军事化，从而平衡了平民控制所产生的为战争牺牲的厌恶情绪；（3）由平民控制向自愿，技术密集，规模缩小的军队过渡，这减少了公民在军事政策中的利益。通过参考美国，以色列和俄罗斯的情况，探讨了该论证的合理性。（3）由平民控制向自愿，技术密集，规模缩小的军队过渡，这减少了公民在军事政策中的利益。通过参考美国，以色列和俄罗斯的情况，探讨了该论证的合理性。（3）由平民控制向自愿，技术密集，规模缩小的军队过渡，这减少了公民在军事政策中的利益。通过参考美国，以色列和俄罗斯的情况，探讨了该论证的合理性。