The article contributes to the growing debate on parliamentary war powers and shows how parliaments matter in shaping both force deployment and force employment. Through original analysis of the Italian and German decision-making on military interventions after the Cold War, the article illustrates how formal and informal constraints shape the opportunity structures faced by executives that are willing to undertake military interventions. Revisiting, and building on, the great deal of research recently emerged on institutional constraints to the use of force, the article details the types of costs – namely, transaction and audience costs – linked to involvement of legislatives in the decision-making and provides empirical support for theories based on parliamentary war powers, adding new dimensions of analysis.

中文翻译：

---

和平立法？冷战后的议会和军事干预：来自德国和意大利的见解

这篇文章促进了关于议会战争权力的日益激烈的辩论，并展示了议会在塑造部队部署和部队使用方面的重要性。通过对冷战后意大利和德国关于军事干预的决策的原始分析，本文说明了正式和非正式的限制如何塑造愿意进行军事干预的高管所面临的机会结构。重新审视并建立在最近出现的关于使用武力的制度约束的大量研究的基础上，文章详细介绍了与立法者参与决策相关的成本类型——即交易和受众成本，并提供了实证支持基于议会战争权力的理论，增加了新的分析维度。