ABSTRACT

Resource-rich dictatorships are more inclined to repress civil society than others. In this paper, we analyze the collapse and persistence of authoritarian regimes in terms of oil price shocks and the organizational density of civil society. This organizational density indicates the ability of citizens to credibly threaten the dictator with a revolution and therefore induce regime change. In the civil society protest game, regime change becomes likely in the occurrence of a negative oil price shock, whereas a positive oil shock increases the extractive capacity of the dictator, thus preserving the authoritarian status quo. In the civil society persecution game, repression of failed revolutionaries can avert revolution if a negative oil price shock occurs and the organizational density of civil society is low ex-ante. Historical and contemporary illustrations are drawn from Iran and Russia, respectively.

抽象的

资源丰富的独裁政权比其他政权更倾向于压制公民社会。在本文中，我们从油价冲击和公民社会的组织密度方面分析了专制政权的崩溃和持久性。这种组织密度表明公民有能力通过革命切实威胁独裁者，从而引发政权更迭。在民间社会的抗议博弈中，发生负面的石油价格震荡时可能会发生政权更迭，而正面的石油震荡会增加独裁者的提取能力，从而保留了威权主义的现状。在公民社会的迫害游戏中，如果发生负面的石油价格冲击并且公民社会的组织密度较低，镇压失败的革命者可以避免革命事前。历史和当代插图分别来自伊朗和俄罗斯。