In this paper I provide an exposition and critique of the Organic View of Ethical Status, as outlined by Torrance (2008). A key presupposition of this view is that only moral patients can be moral agents. It is claimed that because artificial agents lack sentience, they cannot be proper subjects of moral concern (i.e. moral patients). This account of moral standing in principle excludes machines from participating in our moral universe. I will argue that the Organic View operationalises anthropocentric intuitions regarding sentience ascription, and by extension how we identify moral patients. The main difference between the argument I provide here and traditional arguments surrounding moral attributability is that I do not necessarily defend the view that internal states ground our ascriptions of moral patiency. This is in contrast to views such as those defended by Singer (1975, 2011) and Torrance (2008), where concepts such as sentience play starring roles. I will raise both conceptual and epistemic issues with regards to this sense of sentience. While this does not preclude the usage of sentience outright, it suggests that we should be more careful in our usage of internal mental states to ground our moral ascriptions. Following from this I suggest other avenues for further exploration into machine moral patiency which may not have the same shortcomings as the Organic View.

在本文中，我对 Torrance (2008) 所概述的伦理地位有机观进行了阐述和批判。这种观点的一个关键前提是，只有道德患者才能成为道德代理人。据称，由于人工代理缺乏知觉，它们不能成为道德关注的适当对象（即道德患者）。这种对道德立场的解释原则上将机器排除在我们的道德世界之外。我将争辩说，有机观点将关于情感归属的人类中心直觉操作化，进而扩展了我们如何识别道德患者。我在这里提供的论点与围绕道德可归因性的传统论点之间的主要区别在于，我并不一定要捍卫内部状态是我们对道德耐心的归因的观点。这与 Singer (1975, 2011) 和 Torrance (2008) 所捍卫的观点形成鲜明对比，在这些观点中，诸如感知之类的概念起着主导作用。我将提出关于这种感觉的概念和认知问题。虽然这并不完全排除感知的使用，但它表明我们应该更加谨慎地使用内部心理状态来建立我们的道德归属。在此之后，我建议进一步探索机器道德耐心的其他途径，这些途径可能没有与有机观点相同的缺点。它表明我们应该更加谨慎地使用内部心理状态来建立我们的道德归属。在此之后，我建议进一步探索机器道德耐心的其他途径，这些途径可能没有与有机观点相同的缺点。它表明我们应该更加谨慎地使用内部心理状态来建立我们的道德归属。在此之后，我建议进一步探索机器道德耐心的其他途径，这些途径可能没有与有机观点相同的缺点。