In this article, a concise argument for computational rationality as a basis for artificial moral agency is advanced. Some ethicists have long argued that rational agents can become artificial moral agents. However, most of their views have come from purely philosophical perspectives, thus making it difficult to transfer their arguments to a scientific and analytical frame of reference. The result has been a disintegrated approach to the conceptualisation and design of artificial moral agents. In this article, I make the argument for computational rationality as an integrative element that effectively combines the philosophical and computational aspects of artificial moral agency. This logically leads to a philosophically coherent and scientifically consistent model for building artificial moral agents. Besides providing a possible answer to the question of how to build artificial moral agents, this model also invites sound debate from multiple disciplines, which should help to advance the field of machine ethics forward.

在本文中，提出了将计算理性作为人工道德代理基础的简明论证。一些伦理学家长期以来一直认为，理性的代理人可以成为人为的道德代理人。然而，他们的大部分观点都来自纯粹的哲学观点，因此很难将他们的论点转化为科学和分析的参考框架。结果是对人工道德代理的概念化和设计采用了一种瓦解的方法。在本文中，我将计算理性作为一个有效结合人工道德代理的哲学和计算方面的综合元素进行论证。这在逻辑上导致了一个哲学上连贯且科学上一致的模型，用于构建人工道德代理。