ABSTRACT

This article examines how changing collaborations between the Czechoslovakian, Soviet, and East German intelligence services during the 1960s formed the intelligence context of responses to the Prague Spring of 1968. The author uses international history to locate the debates over the uprising among the so-called Warsaw Five throughout 1968 in much longer interplay between local and regional drives for securitisation, centred on intelligence collaborations. This leads us to a reconsideration of the centrality of intelligence collaboration in responses to the crisis and the extent to which actors beyond the borders of Czechoslovakia conditioned these responses.

摘要

本文探讨了1960年代捷克斯洛伐克，苏联和东德情报部门之间不断变化的合作如何形成了对1968年布拉格之春的回应的情报背景。作者利用国际历史来探讨有关起义的辩论，即所谓的起义。整个1968年，《华沙五号》以情报合作为中心，在地方和区域性证券化驱动器之间的互动时间更长。这使我们重新考虑了情报合作在应对危机中的中心作用，以及捷克斯洛伐克境外的参与者在多大程度上调节了这些应对措施。