Can strong capital regulation prevent risk-taking from deposit insurance? Denmark offers a unique setting providing solid identification for testing risk incentives from deposit insurance under strong capital regulation. The Danish system is a universal system without strong risk exposure regulation. Commercial banks and savings banks have different ownership structures but are subject to the same set of regulations, but savings banks have no incentive to increase risk after the implementation of a deposit insurance scheme. We show that commercial banks did not increase their risk at the introduction of deposit insurance compared to savings banks. We attribute this to strong capital requirements and a firm closure policy. The results also hold for large commercial banks, indicating that the systemic risk did not increase either. Finally, there is no evidence that commercial banks increase their risk by allowing their customers to increase their leverage (risk) compared with customers in savings banks.

强有力的资本监管能否阻止存款保险带来的风险？丹麦提供了一个独特的环境，为在强有力的资本监管下测试存款保险的风险激励提供了可靠的识别。丹麦系统是一个通用系统，没有严格的风险敞口监管。商业银行和储蓄银行拥有不同的所有权结构，但受到相同的监管，但储蓄银行在实施存款保险计划后没有增加风险的动力。我们表明，与储蓄银行相比，商业银行在引入存款保险时并未增加其风险。我们将此归因于强大的资本要求和严格的关闭政策。结果也适用于大型商业银行，表明系统性风险也没有增加。最后，