ABSTRACT

This paper examines the propensity for host governments and the groups they sponsor to engage in violence in areas that host refugee populations. Drawing on arguments that governments strategically delegate violence to affiliated groups for “plausible deniability” purposes, it argues that, due to concerns over self-settled refugees’ welfare burden as well as the concern that these refugees will choose to live in border areas that are more vulnerable to (or useful for) militant activity, host governments, and their proxies are likely to target violence in areas with more substantial refugee self-settlement. At the same time, it anticipates that host governments will “outsource” this violence to surrogate groups where sizable camp-settled populations are present, due to a heightened risk of suffering international audience costs. Findings from a large-N sample of countries in Africa provide some evidence of the hypothesized outsourcing effect. While the presence of sizable camps alongside large self-settled populations is associated with a reduction in the likelihood of violence by host governments, it significantly increases the likelihood of violence committed by host-aligned proxies.

摘要

本文研究了收容国政府及其赞助的团体在收容难民人口的地区从事暴力活动的倾向。根据政府出于“合理的可否认性”目的将战略性地将暴力委派给附属团体的论点，该论据认为，由于对自行解决的难民的福利负担感到关切，以及对这些难民将选择居住在边境地区的担忧东道国政府及其代理更容易遭受好战活动的侵害（或对激进活动有用），很可能将难民定为具有更多自我解决能力的地区的暴力活动。同时，它预计东道国政府将把这种暴力“外包”给存在大量营地定居人口的替代群体，因为这增加了承受国际观众费用的风险。来自大量N个非洲国家的调查结果为假设的外包效应提供了一些证据。虽然大量难民营和大量自定居点的存在与减少东道国政府发生暴力的可能性有关，但它显着增加了与东道国对齐的代理人实施暴力的可能性。