ABSTRACT

This article presents the first reassessment of the strategic rationality and credibility of French nuclear weapons policy before 1974. Building on untapped primary material from across the world as well as technical analysis, it shows that early Cold War French nuclear weapon procurement and deployment are incompatible with a precise grand design and the requirements of strategic rationality. The first generation of French nuclear forces also lacked technical credibility, despite reliance on outside help. Several French officials knew about it, as did their allies and adversaries. These findings de-exceptionalise French nuclear history and challenge conventional wisdom about Cold War nuclear history.

摘要

本文首次对 1974 年之前法国核武器政策的战略合理性和可信度进行了重新评估。 基于世界各地未开发的主要材料以及技术分析，它表明冷战初期法国核武器采购和部署与精确的宏伟设计和战略合理性的要求。尽管依赖外部帮助，第一代法国核力量也缺乏技术可信度。几位法国官员以及他们的盟友和对手都知道这件事。这些发现将法国核历史排除在外，并挑战了关于冷战核历史的传统智慧。