ABSTRACT

Swiss climate policy consists of three regulatory instruments for greenhouse gas emissions reduction: A CO${}_2$ levy, the Swiss Emissions Trading System (CH EHS) and an additional program for medium-sized plants that is labeled ‘nonEHS’ and consists of command-and-control elements plus a sizeable abatement subsidy. Our paper informs about this tripartite climate policy, which is unique in the international context. Second, we estimate the differential impact of the CH EHS and the nonEHS program on plants' emissions. Our empirical strategy exploits a policy change in 2013 that instituted a mandatory emissions trading system for a subset of previously regulated plants. We find that the nonEHS outperforms the CH EHS for a minority of plants, but that on average, the two programs result in similar abatement efforts despite very different financial incentives. Plants that previously engaged in abatement efforts continue to do so even after the financial incentives were reduced by an order of magnitude.

Key policy insights

• We find similar pollution abatement for plants regulated by an emissions trading system relative to plants receiving an abatement subsidy in Switzerland

• This is surprising given that the allowance price in the CH EHS is an order of magnitude lower than the abatement subsidy

• Emissions reductions in the ETS are especially pronounced for large plants, and for plants that had engaged in significant abatement in the past

抽象的

瑞士的气候政策包括三项减少温室气体排放的法规工具：${}_{\mathrm{2个}}$税，瑞士排放交易系统（CH EHS）和一个针对中型工厂的附加程序，标记为“ nonEHS”，由命令和控制元素以及可观的减排补贴组成。我们的论文介绍了这种三方气候政策，这在国际背景下是独一无二的。其次，我们估算CH EHS和nonEHS计划对工厂排放的不同影响。我们的经验策略利用了2013年的政策变更，该政策变更为一部分先前受监管的工厂建立了强制性排放交易系统。我们发现，对于少数工厂而言，nonEHS优于CH EHS，但平均而言，尽管有不同的经济激励措施，但这两个计划的减排效果相似。

重要政策见解

• 我们发现，与在瑞士获得减排补贴的工厂相比，由排放权交易系统监管的工厂也有类似的减排措施。

• 鉴于CH EHS中的配额价格比减排补贴低一个数量级，这令人惊讶。

• 对于大型工厂以及过去进行过大幅度减排的工厂，ETS的减排尤为明显