What does it take for Islam and science to engage in a genuine conversation with each other? This essay is an attempt to answer this question by clarifying the conditions which make having such a conversation possible and plausible. I will first distinguish between three notions of conversation: the trivial conversation (which requires sharing a common language and the meaning of its ordinary expressions), superficial conversation (in which although the language is shared, the communicators fail to share the meaning of their theoretical terms), and genuine conversation (which implies sharing the language and the meaning of ordinary as well as theoretical terms). I will then argue that our real concern with regard to the exchange between Islam and science is to be to specify the conditions under which their proponents can engage in a genuine conversation with each other and that such a conversation to take place essentially requires sharing a common ontology. Following Quine, I will argue that Muslims, like the followers of any religion, would have no other choice but to work from within science. Doing so, however, would not prevent Muslims from having a genuine conversation with the proponents of other worldviews because when the shared ontology fails to offer any potentially testable answer to our remaining questions about the world, the Islamic viewpoint can appear as a genuine alternative among other underdetermined ones, deciding between which would be a matter of pragmatic criteria.

中文翻译：

---

伊斯兰与科学：真正辩论的哲学基础

伊斯兰和科学之间进行真正的对话需要什么？本文试图通过澄清使这种对话成为可能和合理的条件来回答这个问题。我将首先区分三种对话概念：琐碎的对话（需要共享一种通用语言及其普通表达的含义），浅浅的对话（尽管这些语言是共享的，但交流者却无法共享其理论上的含义）术语）和真正的对话（这意味着共享普通术语以及理论术语的语言和含义）。然后，我将争辩说，我们对伊斯兰与科学之间的交流的真正关注是要规定其支持者可以相互进行真正对话的条件，而这样的对话本质上需要分享共同点。本体。在奎因之后，我将争辩说，穆斯林像任何宗教的信徒一样，除了在科学界从事工作外别无选择。但是，这样做并不会阻止穆斯林与其他世界观的拥护者进行真诚的交谈，因为当共享的本体论无法为我们对世界的剩余问题提供任何可能可检验的答案时，伊斯兰观点可能会成为真正的替代者。其他不确定的决定，这之间的决定将是一个务实的标准。