The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) verifies state compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty through nuclear safeguards. The agency's legitimacy derives from the convincing display of technical authority. The politics of nuclear things, however, constantly threaten to undermine this authority. Nuclear safeguards are made legibly authoritative and credibly technical through bureaucratic objectivity. This epistemic logic and practice is widely shared by projects of technocratic governance in the liberal international order. After the discovery of Iraq's secret nuclear weapons program, the IAEA transformed its accounting‐based knowledge practices. However, these transformations into more detective‐like ways of knowing call into question the presumed technical purity of safeguards reports. This article unearths the historical origins of safeguards as bureaucratically objective knowledge and demonstrates its enduring legacy at the IAEA, as its bureaucrats and diplomats attempt to manage the tension between effectiveness and credibility.

中文翻译：

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从会计师到侦探：核保障检查员如何在国际原子能机构获取知识

国际原子能机构（IAEA）通过核保障措施核实国家对《核不扩散条约》的遵守情况。该机构的合法性源于令人信服的技术权威展示。但是，核事物的政治不断威胁要破坏这一权威。通过官僚主义的客观性，使核保障措施具有权威性和可信性。这种认识论逻辑和实践在自由国际秩序中被技术官僚治理项目广泛共享。在发现伊拉克的秘密核武器计划之后，国际原子能机构改变了其基于会计的知识实践。但是，这些转变成更像侦探的知道方式使人们对保障报告的假定技术纯度提出质疑。