We investigate whether managers internalize the spillover effects of their disclosure on the stock price of related firms and strategically alter their disclosure decisions when doing so is beneficial. Using data on firm‐initiated disclosures during all‐cash acquisitions, we find evidence consistent with acquirers strategically generating news that they expect will depress the target's stock price. Our results suggest the disclosure strategy leads to lower target returns during the negotiation period when the takeover price is being determined and results in a lower target premium. These findings are robust to a battery of specifications and falsification tests. Our results are consistent with expected spillovers influencing the timing and content of firms’ disclosures in M&A transactions.

中文翻译：

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企业是否从战略上内部化了披露外溢？现金融资并购的证据

我们调查管理者是否内部化了其披露对关联公司股票价格的溢出效应，并在有利时从战略上改变了其披露决策。利用全现金收购过程中公司启动的披露数据，我们发现与收购方从战略上产生他们预期会压低目标股价的新闻一致的证据。我们的结果表明，在确定收购价的情况下，披露策略导致谈判期间的目标收益降低，并导致目标溢价降低。这些发现对于一系列的规范和伪造测试是可靠的。我们的结果与预期的溢出影响了公司在并购交易中披露的时间和内容一致。