Audit firms need to provide high‐quality audits but they also need to please their clients. We argue that these conflicting incentives become manifest when comparing the incentive effects of equity ownership on engagement quality (EQ) reviewers and audit engagement partners. We predict that EQ reviewers monitor audit quality more closely when they hold greater ownership. In contrast, we expect that equity ownership has conflicting effects on the incentives of engagement partners because they need to please their clients as well as provide high‐quality audits. Consistent with these predictions, we find that the associations between audit adjustments and partner equity ownership are (1) significantly positive for EQ reviewers, (2) significantly negative or insignificant for audit engagement partners, and (3) significantly more positive for EQ reviewers than engagement partners. Our findings suggest that larger ownership stakes motivate EQ reviewers to monitor audit quality more closely, whereas larger ownership stakes do not motivate engagement partners to deliver higher quality audits.

中文翻译：

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打开审计公司的“黑匣子”：审计合伙人所有权对审计调整的影响

审计公司需要提供高质量的审计，但也需要取悦客户。我们认为，当比较股权对参与质量（EQ）审阅者和审计参与伙伴的激励效果时，这些矛盾的激励变得明显。我们预测，情商审核员拥有更大的所有权时，会更加密切地监视审核质量。相比之下，我们预计股权所有权对参与合作伙伴的激励机制会产生冲突，因为他们需要取悦客户并提供高质量的审计。与这些预测一致，我们发现审计调整与合作伙伴股权之间的关联性是（1）对情商评估者显着正相关，（2）对审计参与伙伴显着负相关或无关紧要，（3）对情商审核者的积极性远高于参与合作伙伴。我们的研究结果表明，更大的股权可以激励情商评估人员更紧密地监控审计质量，而更大的股权却不会激励合作伙伴提供更高质量的审计。