‘Revolving doors’ is a well‐suspected phenomenon of skills and knowledge transfer between the private and public sectors. It is thought to be especially notable among elites in transnational policy networks, where mobility can accrue status. In this article, we investigate revolving doors in the area of international financial governance. We target policymakers linked to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) and the International Monetary Fund's Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP). We test for revolving doors by examining the career histories of those working with the BCBS on the development of the Basel II accord, and staff on policy teams for financial systems monitoring via FSAP missions. Using sequence analysis, we trace career histories between 1971 and 2011 to observe the extent of revolving doors. Revolving doors are observed in club‐like elite policy communities but are less prevalent in policy teams in intergovernmental organizations. We find that revolving doors are important in establishing intellectual capture in how an issue is treated within transnational policy networks.

中文翻译：

---

国际金融治理中的旋转门

“旋转门”是在私人和公共部门之间技能和知识转移的一种备受怀疑的现象。人们认为，在跨国政策网络中的精英阶层中，这一点尤其显着，在该网络中，流动性可以提高地位。在本文中，我们将研究国际金融治理领域中的旋转门。我们以与巴塞尔银行监管委员会（BCBS）和国际货币基金组织的金融部门评估计划（FSAP）相关的决策者为目标。我们通过检查与BCBS合作制定《巴塞尔协议II》的人员的职业经历以及通过FSAP任务进行金融系统监控的政策团队的工作人员，测试旋转门。使用序列分析，我们追踪了1971年至2011年之间的职业历史，以观察旋转门的范围。在俱乐部式的精英政策社区中观察到旋转门，但在政府间组织的政策团队中不那么普遍。我们发现旋转门对于在跨国政策网络中如何处理问题建立知识分子捕获至关重要。