We conduct the first comprehensive study of force-the-vote (FTV) provisions in mergers and acquisitions transactions and test competing agency and efficient contracting explanations for their usage. Target FTV provisions are observed more frequently when bidding is costly and are associated with higher target returns, a lower likelihood of competing bids, and a higher likelihood of deal completion. By providing greater deal protection to acquirers, target FTV provisions appear to improve bidding incentives resulting in higher target returns consistent with efficient contracting. Our results are robust to controlling for other merger provisions, such as termination fee provisions, stock voting agreements, and endogeneity concerns.

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为什么收购目标会保护收购方？来自强制投票条款的证据

我们对并购交易中的强制投票 (FTV) 条款进行了首次全面研究，并测试了竞争代理和有效的合同解释对其使用情况。当投标成本高且与更高的目标回报、竞争投标的可能性较低以及交易完成的可能性较高相关时，会更频繁地观察到目标 FTV 条款。通过为收购方提供更大的交易保护，目标 FTV 条款似乎可以改善投标激励，从而与有效的合同签订一致的更高的目标回报。我们的结果对于控制其他合并条款是稳健的，例如终止费条款、股票投票协议和内生性问题。