We study insider trading behavior surrounding the largest bank bailout in history: Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). In politically connected banks, insider buying during the pre-TARP period is associated with increases in abnormal returns around bank-specific TARP announcement; for unconnected banks, trading and returns are uncorrelated. Results hold across insiders within the same bank and are stronger for finance-related government connections. Through a Freedom of Information Act request, we obtained the previously undisclosed TARP funds requested; the ratio of received to requested funds correlates both with abnormal returns and insider buying behavior in connected banks.

中文翻译：

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政治关系和知情交易：来自 TARP 的证据

我们研究围绕历史上最大的银行救助计划的内幕交易行为：问题资产救助计划 (TARP)。在有政治关联的银行中，TARP 前期间的内幕购买与银行特定的 TARP 公告相关的异常回报增加有关；对于未连接的银行，交易和回报是不相关的。结果适用于同一家银行的内部人员，并且与金融相关的政府关系更强。通过信息自由法案的要求，我们获得了先前未披露的 TARP 资金；收到资金与请求资金的比率与关联银行的异常回报和内幕购买行为相关。