Observed contract structures are competitive solutions to the problem of maximizing stakeholder welfare when contracting is costly. Winning contract structures typically set fixed payoffs for most stakeholders, with residual risk borne by shareholders, who then get most of the decision rights. With rising interest in environmental, social, and governance (ESG) issues, there is sentiment for replacing the max shareholder wealth decision rule with max shareholder welfare. This view does not recognize that investors view max welfare in terms of their overall consumption‐investment portfolios. Since firms are not privy to the total ESG exposures of shareholders, max shareholder wealth is the appropriate decision rule.

中文翻译：

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合同成本，利益相关者资本主义和ESG

可以观察到的合同结构是竞争的解决方案，可以解决在签约成本高昂时最大化利益相关者的福利的问题。赢得合同的结构通常会为大多数利益相关者设定固定的收益，而剩余风险则由股东承担，股东随后将获得大部分决策权。随着人们对环境，社会和治理（ESG）问题的兴趣日益浓厚，人们开始以最大股东福利取代最大股东财富决策规则。这种观点并没有认识到投资者从整体消费投资组合的角度看待最大福利。由于公司对股东的ESG敞口并不了解，因此最大股东财富是适当的决策规则。