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The group home as moral laboratory: tracing the ethic of autonomy in Dutch intellectual disability care
Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy ( IF 1.917 ) Pub Date : 2021-01-04 , DOI: 10.1007/s11019-020-09991-y
Simon van der Weele 1 , Femmianne Bredewold 1 , Carlo Leget 2 , Evelien Tonkens 1
Affiliation  

This paper examines the prevalence of the ideal of “independence” in intellectual disability care in the Netherlands. It responds to a number of scholars who have interrogated this ideal through the lens of Michel Foucault’s vocabulary of governmentality. Such analyses hold that the goal of “becoming independent” subjects people with intellectual disabilities to various constraints and limitations that ensure their continued oppression. As a result, these authors contend, the commitment to the ideal of “independence” – the “ethic of autonomy” – actually threatens to become an obstacle to flourishing in the group home. This paper offers an alternative analysis. It does so by drawing on a case study taken from an ethnographic study on group home life in the Netherlands. Briefly put, the disagreement stems from differing conceptualizations of moral life. Put in the vocabulary of moral anthropologist Cheryl Mattingly, the authors propose to approach the group home more from a “first-person” perspective rather than chiefly from a “third-person” perspective. They then draw on Mattingly to cast the group home as a “moral laboratory” in which the ethic of autonomy is not just reproduced but also enacted, and in which the terms of (in)dependence constantly get renegotiated in practice. What emerges is not only a new perspective on the workings of the “ethic of autonomy” in the group home, but also an argument about the possible limitations of the vocabulary of governmentality for analysing care practices.



中文翻译:

集体之家作为道德实验室:追溯荷兰智障护理中的自主伦理

本文考察了荷兰智障护理中“独立”理想的盛行情况。它回应了许多学者通过米歇尔福柯的政府性词汇来质疑这一理想。此类分析认为,“变得独立”的目标使智障人士受到各种约束和限制,以确保他们继续受到压迫。因此,这些作者认为,对“独立”理想的承诺——“自主伦理”——实际上有可能成为集体家庭蓬勃发展的障碍。本文提供了另一种分析。它通过借鉴荷兰集体家庭生活的人种学研究中的案例研究来做到这一点。简而言之,这种分歧源于对道德生活的不同概念。用道德人类学家 Cheryl Mattingly 的话来说,作者建议更多地从“第一人称”的角度而不是主要从“第三人称”的角度来接近这个群体。然后,他们利用 Mattingly 将这个团体塑造成一个“道德实验室”,在其中,自治的伦理不仅被复制而且还被制定,并且在实践中不断地重新谈判(独立)依赖的条款。出现的不仅是对集体之家中“自治伦理”的运作的新观点,而且是关于管理性词汇在分析护理实践时可能存在的局限性的争论。作者建议更多地从“第一人称”的角度而不是主要从“第三人称”的角度来接近群体之家。然后,他们利用 Mattingly 将这个团体塑造成一个“道德实验室”,在其中,自治的伦理不仅被复制而且还被制定,并且在实践中不断地重新谈判(独立)依赖的条款。出现的不仅是对集体之家中“自治伦理”的运作的新观点,而且是关于管理性词汇在分析护理实践时可能存在的局限性的争论。作者建议更多地从“第一人称”的角度而不是主要从“第三人称”的角度来接近群体之家。然后,他们利用 Mattingly 将这个团体塑造成一个“道德实验室”,在其中,自治的伦理不仅被复制而且还被制定,并且在实践中不断地重新谈判(独立)依赖的条款。出现的不仅是对集体之家中“自治伦理”的运作的新观点,而且是关于管理性词汇在分析护理实践时可能存在的局限性的争论。并且在实践中不断地重新谈判(独立)依赖的条款。出现的不仅是对集体之家中“自治伦理”的运作的新观点,而且是关于管理性词汇在分析护理实践时可能存在的局限性的争论。并且在实践中不断地重新谈判(独立)依赖的条款。出现的不仅是对集体之家中“自治伦理”的运作的新观点,而且是关于管理性词汇在分析护理实践时可能存在的局限性的争论。

更新日期:2021-01-13
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