The widespread implementation of anti-corruption agencies (ACAs) has been an important public administration trend of the past decades. Considering the multifaceted challenges they face, much attention has been afforded to the legal structures which condition their bureaucratic autonomy. Little is known, however, about the reputational dimension of the autonomy of ACAs. This paper contributes a theoretical bridge between bureaucratic reputation theory and the anti-corruption literature, by studying how these agencies construct and manage their reputations over time. Using a mixed-methods research design, this paper employs a narrative analysis of commission hearings and semi-structured interviews, paired with quantitative content analysis of media articles and agency web-communications. The case of Quebec’s (Canada) ACA shows the inherent challenges, strategies and non-linearity of reputation building, which enriches our understanding of the difficulty of crafting an agency’s de facto bureaucratic autonomy.

在过去的几十年中，反腐败机构的广泛实施一直是重要的公共管理趋势。考虑到他们面临的多方面挑战，人们对限制其官僚自治的法律结构给予了极大关注。但是，关于ACA自治的声誉范围知之甚少。通过研究这些机构随着时间的推移如何构建和管理其声誉，本文为官僚声誉理论和反腐败文献之间的理论桥梁做出了贡献。本文采用混合方法研究设计，对佣金听证会和半结构化访谈进行叙述性分析，并结合媒体文章和代理商网络交流的定量内容分析。