I present a realist theory of subversion among great powers, an understudied phenomenon in the burgeoning literature on subversive statecraft. I show that a simple, rational cost-benefit calculus accounts for comparatively low-levels of subversion among non-belligerent great powers, much higher levels among belligerent great powers, and more frequent, violent and larger-scale subversion against weaker targets. Brief case studies of mid-twentieth century subversion featuring the Soviet Union and the United States illustrate the theory and provide preliminary support. Theory and evidence show that the conditions that are conducive to highly consequential subversion among great powers are quite limited and reversible. This gives rise to skepticism concerning claims that today’s strategic environment has fundamentally transformed the nature of great power rivalry so as to accord a newly central place to subversion.

中文翻译：

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现实主义与大国颠覆

我提出了一种现实主义的大国颠覆理论，这是新兴的颠覆性治国研究文献中未被充分研究的现象。我表明，一个简单、合理的成本效益计算可以解释非交战大国的颠覆程度相对较低，交战大国的颠覆程度更高，以及对较弱目标的更频繁、更暴力和更大规模的颠覆。以苏联和美国为特色的二十世纪中叶颠覆的简要案例研究说明了这一理论并提供了初步支持。理论和证据表明，有利于大国之间高度颠覆的条件是非常有限和可逆的。