Stakeholder honesty is highly important for managers, for instance, in decisions involving hiring. Due to reciprocity, stakeholders are more likely to be honest if the managers act honestly themselves. However, external stakeholders often cannot observe managers’ actions and instead have to rely on signals. This article examines the effects of two signals—a manager’s owner family membership and religious affiliation—on stakeholder honesty. By conducting an economic experiment and a survey, we find that stakeholders behave more honestly toward family managers compared to nonfamily managers. This effect is reinforced if the family manager is presented as religious.

中文翻译：

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信号和利益相关者诚实：关于所有者家庭成员和宗教信仰的个体和综合影响

例如，在涉及招聘的决策中，利益相关者的诚实对于管理者来说非常重要。由于互惠，如果管理者自己诚实行事，利益相关者更有可能诚实。然而，外部利益相关者往往无法观察管理者的行为，而不得不依赖信号。本文考察了两个信号——经理的所有者家庭成员身份和宗教信仰——对利益相关者诚实的影响。通过进行经济实验和调查，我们发现与非家族管理者相比，利益相关者对家族管理者的行为更诚实。如果家族经理表现出宗教信仰，这种效果会得到加强。