The aim of this article is to investigate the Habermasian way of problematizing the European political situation through consideration of the conceptual framework within which he develops his proposal. I begin by clarifying various conceptual difficulties that emerge when thinking about politics within the European Union. I then focus on the concept of popular sovereignty as procedure, which Habermas develops in Between Facts and Norms against the historical backdrop of the nation state. In the debate regarding European constitutionalization, the concept of popular sovereignty as procedure first assumes a critical function (made possible owing to its desubstantializing effect) against proponents of the no demos thesis. More recently, Habermas has advanced a concept of shared/divided sovereignty, which becomes indispensable when we consider Europe as a democratic federation. The conclusions hereby drawn disclose two problematic aspects of Habermas’s recent proposal. Respectively, these concern the viability of his approach and the questionable plausibility of this proposed federation’s ability to uphold democracy in terms of self-determination.

本文的目的是通过考虑他提出提案的概念框架来研究哈贝马斯式的解决欧洲政治局势问题的方式。首先，我将阐明在思考欧盟内部政治时出现的各种概念上的困难。然后，我将重点放在作为程序的公众主权概念上，哈贝马斯在《事实与规范之间》中提出了这一概念。在民族国家的历史背景下。在有关欧洲宪政化的辩论中，作为程序的公众主权概念首先承担了反对无人口论论文支持者的关键职能（由于其去实体化作用而成为可能）。最近，哈贝马斯提出了共享/分割主权的概念，当我们将欧洲视为民主联盟时，这是必不可少的。由此得出的结论揭示了哈贝马斯最近提议中的两个有问题的方面。这些分别涉及到他的方法的可行性以及这个提议的联邦在自决方面维护民主的能力的可疑性。