This article addresses how far wage imbalances in the Eurozone can be imputable to intentional agency by collective bargaining organizations. Using Archer’s morphogenetic approach, we explain the agentic role of social partners in core (Germany) and periphery (Spain) cases, in relation with the respective collective bargaining regimes. We show that the capacity of macro- and meso-level organizations to effect wage-setting practices can be constrained inadvertently by contextual influences with morphostatic properties, generating constrained modes of corporate agency. Yet wage moderation is best understood as a form of agency itself, functioning ‘by being’ rather than ‘doing’, which over time can become more innovative. We contrast this finding with the less constrained capacity of more institutionalized corporate agents, such as transnational business corporations and central state agencies.

本文讨论了集体谈判组织可以将欧元区工资失衡归咎于故意代理的程度。使用阿切尔的形态发生方法，我们解释了在核心（德国）和外围（西班牙）案例中社会伙伴的代理作用，并与各自的集体谈判制度有关。我们表明，宏观和中层组织影响工资设定做法的能力可能会受到具有形态静态特性的情境影响而无意间受到限制，从而产生了公司代理的约束模式。然而，最好将工资节制理解为一种代理机构本身的形式，其作用是“存在”而不是“做”，随着时间的流逝，它会变得更具创新性。我们将此发现与制度化的公司代理商的约束能力降低相比，