This article investigates the ways in which state and non-state laws become intricately intertwined in practices of conflict resolution in rural Bangladesh. Instead of inhabiting separate legal universes, I show how state and non-state laws become entangled in what I call the logic of non-enforcement. People in rural Bangladesh frequently appeal to state courts—yet they frequently do so not in order to get binding and enforceable verdicts, but to alter the outcomes of a non-state justice institution like the shalish in their favour. This leads to unexpected patterns of political accountability: people expect local elected politicians to intervene in the state courts, stop pending cases and bring them back to community-based resolution in non-state fora. Elected politicians are thus held accountable according to their ability to prevent the enforcement of state laws. At the same time, state agencies frequently bring legal cases to trial in non-state courts. I conceptualise this blurring between state and non-state laws, its underlying social dynamics as well as its normative justifications as a distinct ‘logic of non-enforcement’. According to this logic, state courts decisively affect the outcomes of processes of conflict resolution in rural Bangladesh while state laws nonetheless are systematically not enforced.

中文翻译：

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不执行的逻辑：孟加拉国家法律与非国家法律的纠葛

本文调查了国家和非国家法律在孟加拉国农村冲突解决实践中错综复杂地交织在一起的方式。我没有居住在独立的法律世界中，而是展示了国家和非国家法律如何纠缠在我所谓的不执行逻辑中。孟加拉国农村的人们经常向州法院上诉——但他们经常这样做不是为了获得有约束力和可执行的判决，而是为了改变像 shalish 这样的非国家司法机构的结果对他们有利。This leads to unexpected patterns of political accountability: people expect local elected politicians to intervene in the state courts, stop pending cases and bring them back to community-based resolution in non-state fora. Elected politicians are thus held accountable according to their ability to prevent the enforcement of state laws. 与此同时，国家机构经常在非国家法院审理法律案件。我将国家和非国家法律之间的这种模糊、其潜在的社会动态以及其规范性理由概念化为一种独特的“不执行逻辑”。根据这种逻辑，州法院对孟加拉国农村冲突解决过程的结果产生决定性影响，而州法律却没有系统地执行。