This article revisits Marshall Sahlins’s theory of kinship as a ‘mutuality of being’, in which two possible kinship orders are proposed: those that are ‘inherited’ at birth, and others that are ‘made’ in life. Sahlins’s theory is not exactly a reformulation of the classical consanguinity/affinity divide in kinship theory, but instead allows a place for consanguineous ‘blood’ kinship in the first of the two orders alongside a myriad of affinal situations. What then does it mean to ‘make’ kinship in life? Taking kinship and community as related problematics in anthropology and philosophy, respectively, I suggest in this article that the conditions for ‘making’ kinship in life can be established by borrowing from Jean-Luc Nancy’s philosophy of community, in which community is the sharing of being. But being, as Nancy points out, is finite, meaning that it is curtailed by the experience of death. Joining the two discursive paradigms of Sahlins and Nancy, my argument is that if kinship can be ‘made’ in life, and life is delineated by finitude, then it is life and death (here conceptualised as biological forces) that act as frontiers for both inheriting and ‘making’ kinship.

本文重新审视了马歇尔·萨林斯（Marshall Sahlins）的亲属关系理论，认为它是一种“存在的共同体”，其中提出了两种可能的亲属关系顺序：一种是在出生时“继承”的，另一种是在生活中“制造的”。萨林斯理论并不完全是对亲属关系理论中经典血缘/亲和力划分的重新表述，而是在两个等级中的第一个中为血缘“血统”血统以及无数亲戚关系提供了场所。那么，在生活中“建立”亲戚关系意味着什么？在本文中，我建议将血族和社区分别作为人类学和哲学中的相关问题，我建议可以通过借鉴让·卢克·南希的社区哲学来建立“亲属”生活的条件，在社区哲学中，社区就是存在。但正如南希指出的那样，存在是有限的，意思是它被死亡的经历所限制。结合萨林斯和南希的两种话语范式，我的论点是，如果可以在生活中“建立亲缘关系”，而生活是通过有限性来描绘的，那么生与死（在这里被概念化为生物力）则是两者的前沿。继承和“缔造”血缘关系。