This article describes and explains labour market reforms in Portugal during the sovereign debt crisis from 2011 to 2014. Policy outputs were not homogenous, but differentiated between a first phase where recalibration co-existed alongside hard liberalising measures and a second phase, from late 2012, where recalibration was dropped and liberalisation further deregulated employment protection and security and eroded collective bargaining. This variation is explained by the changing coalitional politics and blame allocation underpinning policymaking under conditionality. Initial reforms resulted from a broad informal political coalition spanning the governing centre-right parties, the main opposition party, a trade union and employer confederations; its breakdown in late 2012 led to the executive’s increasing centralisation, the shut down of social concertation, and more radical policy outputs. The article shows that cooperation between government and opposition and government and social partners is possible even under external conditionality, how coalition politics affects the nature and direction of reforms, and highlights how political dynamics of blame allocation drive the process of coalition building and breakdown.

中文翻译：

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变革的政治。葡萄牙主权债务危机期间的联盟政治和劳动力市场改革

本文描述并解释了 2011 年至 2014 年主权债务危机期间葡萄牙的劳动力市场改革。政策产出并不相同，但在第一阶段与硬自由化措施并存的第一阶段和从 2012 年底开始的第二阶段之间存在差异，重新校准被取消，自由化进一步放松了对就业保护和保障的管制，并削弱了集体谈判。这种变化可以通过不断变化的联盟政治和支持条件下决策的责任分配来解释。最初的改革源于广泛的非正式政治联盟，包括执政的中右翼政党、主要反对党、工会和雇主联合会；它在 2012 年底的崩溃导致行政部门日益集中化，社会协调的关闭，以及更激进的政策输出。文章表明，即使在外部条件下，政府与反对派、政府与社会伙伴之间的合作也是可能的，联盟政治如何影响改革的性质和方向，并强调责任分配的政治动态如何推动联盟的建立和瓦解过程。