We examine whether the presence of loan covenants leads firms to choose either an asset or equity acquisitions. Asset acquisitions involve the selective purchase of a target company's assets, and equity acquisitions involve acquisitions of common stocks. We document that firms with loan covenants are more likely to engage in asset acquisitions as opposed to equity acquisitions. Our results are robust to alternative measures of loan covenants and to endogeneity concerns. Furthermore, the association between loan covenants and asset acquisitions is stronger among firms with greater debt covenant intensity, more severe agency problems, and lower profitability. Acquirers facing more intense competition within their industries are also likely to choose asset acquisitions. Our findings suggest that acquirers' incentives to avoid wealth transfer at the expense of debtholders drive the relation between debt covenants and choice of acquisition structure.

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债务契约与资产与股权收购

我们检查贷款契约的存在是否导致企业选择资产还是股权收购。资产收购涉及对目标公司资产的选择性购买，而股权收购涉及对普通股的收购。我们记录到，拥有贷款契约的公司更有可能从事资产收购，而不是股权收购。我们的结果对于贷款契约的替代措施以及对内生性的关注是有力的。此外，在债务契约强度更大，代理问题更加严重，利润率较低的公司中，贷款契约与资产收购之间的关联性更强。在行业内面临更激烈竞争的收购方也有可能选择资产收购。我们的发现表明，收购方的