This paper designs a reciprocal dumping model to address the control of industrial pollution between two trading partners. Firms generate transboundary pollution from production and environmental taxes represent the pollution control instrument. We ask whether environmental taxes implemented in a non-cooperative setting are more stringent than the globally efficient level. Relative to the globally efficient case, we find in the linear Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium (MPNE) context that the tax rate for both countries is smaller and individual emissions are larger. However, these results may not hold in the non-linear MPNE case depending on market structure and environmental conditions. Unlike the symmetric equilibrium case, the tax rates are always discontinuous under asymmetric MPNEs. The asymmetric equilibrium scenario can give rise to higher individual payoffs relative to the symmetric equilibrium case.

本文设计了一种互惠倾销模型，以解决两个贸易伙伴之间工业污染的控制问题。企业从生产中产生跨界污染，环境税是污染控制手段。我们问在非合作环境下实施的环境税是否比全球有效水平更为严格。相对于全球有效的情况，我们在线性马尔可夫完美纳什均衡（MPNE）上下文中发现，两国的税率较小，个人排放较大。但是，根据市场结构和环境条件，这些结果在非线性MPNE情况下可能不成立。与对称均衡情况不同，在非对称MPNEs下，税率总是不连续的。