Value creation often requires coordinated action by multiple firms. Existing research on value-based strategy emphasizes situations where both parties reasonably anticipate sharing the gains to cooperation and develop arms-length contracts through bargaining. Less existing research on value-based strategy addresses situations where value-creating market transactions fail to occur because one party expects to be worse off from coordinated action, precluding their participation. Although vertical integration or informal contracts potentially overcome this reticence, these solutions are not always feasible or incur costs of their own. We model how firms may be able to strike a stable deal and create value by employing a side payment strategy. This technique mitigates transactional frictions by playing a biform game with a cooperative first stage, which modifies the payoffs in a non-cooperative second stage so that coordinated action becomes feasible in a stable agreement. We also extend the basic analysis to consider variations in contract enforceability, reneging, and presence of multiple counterparties.

价值创造通常需要多个公司的协调行动。现有的基于价值战略的研究强调双方合理预期分享合作收益并通过谈判达成公平合同的情况。现有的关于基于价值的战略的研究较少涉及创造价值的市场交易未能发生的情况，因为一方期望协调行动的后果更糟，从而排除他们的参与。尽管垂直整合或非正式合同可能会克服这种沉默，但这些解决方案并不总是可行或会产生自身成本。我们模拟了公司如何通过采用边支付策略来达成稳定的交易并创造价值。该技术通过玩合作第一阶段的双形式博弈来减轻交易摩擦，这会修改非合作第二阶段的收益，以便在稳定的协议中协调行动变得可行。我们还扩展了基本分析，以考虑合同可执行性、违约和多个交易对手的存在方面的变化。