This paper formulates the climate change dilemma as an adaption of public goods game. The Nash equilibrium of the climate change dilemma is analyzed in the cases of discrete contribution and continuous contribution. Analytic results show that environmental feedback promotes cooperation to a certain extent, but as the number of players increases, zero contribution becomes the only Nash equilibrium in most cases. A dynamic model based on Particle Swarm Optimization algorithm is then proposed for the climate change dilemma, where the information exchange is restricted by a network. Simulation results show that the proposed dynamic model can effectively promote cooperation, especially in the case of continuous contribution, and making decisions based on historical information can largely boost the average contribution.

本文将气候变化的困境表述为对公共产品博弈的一种适应。在离散贡献和连续贡献的情况下，分析了气候变化困境的纳什均衡。分析结果表明，环境反馈在一定程度上促进了合作，但是随着参与者数量的增加，在大多数情况下，零贡献成为唯一的纳什均衡。针对气候变化的困境，提出了一种基于粒子群优化算法的动态模型，该模型的信息交换受到网络的限制。仿真结果表明，所提出的动态模型可以有效地促进合作，特别是在持续贡献的情况下，并且基于历史信息做出决策可以大大提高平均贡献。