ABSTRACT Since the signing of the historic ‘Brussels Agreement’ on 19 April 2013 on the normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia, Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić and the Progressive Party have oscillated between competing tensions emanating from seeking membership in the European Union and those stemming from the retention of Kosovo, including the party’s uncompromising position on non-recognition. Following two-level game theory, this paper offers a comparative analysis of the Progressive Party’s multi-level game strategy vis-à-vis Kosovo and the EU, arguing that while the initial success of the Brussels Agreement can predominantly be attributed to the rise in popular support for EU accession, Serbian policy towards Kosovo appears to be far less clear and often contradictory and therefore, Serbian government strategy cannot have been influenced by public opinion.

中文翻译：

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多层次游戏：进步党领导下的塞尔维亚政府对科索沃和欧盟的战略

摘要自2013年4月19日签署历史性的《布鲁塞尔协议》以来，科索沃与塞尔维亚之间的关系正常化，塞尔维亚总统AleksandarVučić和进步党一直在因寻求加入欧盟而产生的相互竞争的紧张气氛与由欧盟引起的紧张气氛之间摇摆不定保留科索沃，包括该党在不承认方面毫不妥协的立场。遵循两级博弈理论，本文对进步党针对科索沃和欧盟的多层次博弈策略进行了比较分析，认为尽管《布鲁塞尔协定》的最初成功主要可以归因于欧盟的崛起。普遍支持加入欧盟，塞尔维亚对科索沃的政策似乎还不够明确，而且常常是矛盾的，因此，