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The Limits of Epistemic Control, the Powers of Actualization, and the Moral Economies of a Fictional Collective
Social Epistemology ( IF 1.625 ) Pub Date : 2020-01-23 , DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2019.1706123
Judith Igelsböck 1, 2
Affiliation  

ABSTRACT This essay narrates from a collective of social scientists giving up on the phantasy of ‘being in,’ or ‘having’ epistemic control, not – however – on the ‘dream of epistemic democracy’. This community does not feel ‘pre post-truth’ nostalgia. And when there is a special issue asking ‘what are possible reconfigurations of collaborative research beyond control?’, they reply: ‘we are not sure, but we are in the mood to figure it out.’ This mood is not related to the naïve assumption that knowledge production was not a powerful control machine in its own right, or that issues of control could be ignored or dismissed as vanities. It is built upon the feeling that dynamics of epistemic control cannot be escaped, but can and should be played and experimented with. The essay makes use of Lorraine Daston’s conception of a ‘moral economy of science’ to fictionalize the ‘mental state’ of such a collective of social scientists and the ‘emotional forces’ integral to their ways of performing research.

中文翻译:

认知控制的局限性、实现的权力和虚构集体的道德经济

摘要这篇文章讲述了一群社会科学家放弃了“处于”或“拥有”认知控制的幻想,而不是——然而——“认知民主的梦想”。这个社区不会感到“前后真相”的怀旧情绪。当有一个特殊问题询问“协作研究有哪些可能无法控制的重构?”时,他们回答说:“我们不确定,但我们有心情弄清楚。” 这种情绪与幼稚的假设无关,即知识生产本身并不是强大的控制机器,或者控制问题可以被忽略或被视为虚荣。它建立在这样一种感觉之上,即认知控制的动态无法逃脱,但可以而且应该进行游戏和试验。
更新日期:2020-01-23
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