Abstract This article reconsiders the theoretical logic behind the “Madman Theory”—the argument that it can be beneficial in coercive bargaining to be viewed as mad, or insane. I theorize about how we can best define perceived madness in a way that is relevant for analyzing coercive bargaining. I identify four types of perceived madness, broken down along two dimensions. The first dimension is whether a leader is perceived to (a) make rational calculations, but based on extreme preferences, or (b) actually deviate from rational consequence-based decision making. The second dimension is whether a leader’s madness is perceived to be (a) situational or (b) dispositional. I argue that situational extreme preferences constitute the type of perceived madness that is most helpful in coercive bargaining. I illustrate my argument using case studies of Adolf Hitler, Nikita Khrushchev, Saddam Hussein, and Muammar Gaddafi.

中文翻译：

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重温疯子理论：评估不同形式的疯狂认知在强制谈判中的影响

摘要 本文重新考虑了“疯子理论”背后的理论逻辑——即被视为疯子或疯子对强制谈判有益的论点。我对我们如何以与分析强制谈判相关的方式最好地定义感知的疯狂进行理论化。我确定了四种感知到的疯狂，按两个维度分解。第一个维度是领导者是否被认为 (a) 做出理性计算，但基于极端偏好，或者 (b) 实际上偏离了基于结果的理性决策。第二个维度是领导者的疯狂是否被认为是 (a) 情境或 (b) 性格。我认为，情境极端偏好构成了在强制谈判中最有帮助的一种感知到的疯狂。