Abstract Expeditionary counterinsurgents often have trouble adapting to meet insurgent challenges, resulting in the adoption and retention of ineffective strategies. Whereas explanations often focus on military preferences and cultures, this paper argues civilian policymakers ultimately select counterinsurgency strategy from the recommendations of their advisors, and these strategies will reflect policymakers’ preferences. The goals and instruments of a counterinsurgency campaign are significantly shaped and constrained by policymakers’ foreign policy objectives and the geostrategic pressures they perceive. Strategy changes when geostrategic shifts render existing strategies liabilities for new foreign policy objectives; otherwise, existing strategies, consistent with existing goals, are likely to persist. A most similar comparison of British responses to two insurgencies in the Palestine Mandate, the Arab Rebellion (1936–39), demonstrating successful strategic adaptation, and the Jewish Rebellion (1945–47), demonstrating the failure to change ineffective strategy, reveal the role played by geostrategic pressures stemming from the onset and aftermath of World War II.

中文翻译：

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“更广阔的视野”：反叛乱战略和适应的地缘战略决定因素，来自巴勒斯坦托管地阿拉伯和犹太叛乱的证据

摘要 远征的反叛乱分子经常难以适应叛乱的挑战，导致采用和保留无效的策略。尽管解释通常侧重于军事偏好和文化，但本文认为文职政策制定者最终会从其顾问的建议中选择平叛战略，而这些战略将反映政策制定者的偏好。反叛乱运动的目标和工具在很大程度上受到决策者外交政策目标和他们所感知的地缘战略压力的影响和制约。当地缘战略转变使现有战略对新的外交政策目标承担责任时，战略会发生变化；否则，与现有目标一致的现有战略很可能会持续下去。