Abstract Petro-alignment, a quid pro quo arrangement whereby great powers offer security in exchange for oil states’ friendly oil policies, is a widely used and yet undertheorized energy security strategy. One consequential aspect of this exchange is that great powers choose different levels of security commitment to keep oil producers friendly. With what criteria do great powers rank oil states? How do we conceptualize different types of petro-alignments? What exactly do great powers and oil producers exchange under each petro-alignment type? I posit that a mix of market power and geostrategic location determines the strategic value and vulnerability of individual client oil states, which then generates four corresponding types of petro-alignment—security guarantee, strategic alignment, strategic favor, and neglect. Two carefully selected case comparisons—Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in 1970–91, and Azerbaijan and Ecuador in 1990–2013—show how great powers created, utilized, and maintained petro-alignments under the unique logic of oil markets and across varying geopolitical settings. The findings have important implications on great powers’ grand strategies, strategic behaviors of oil states, and the role of oil in international security.

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粗暴的讨价还价：大国、石油国家和石油联盟

摘要 石油联盟是大国提供安全以换取石油国家友好的石油政策的一种交换安排，是一种广泛使用但理论不足的能源安全战略。这种交流的一个重要方面是，大国选择不同级别的安全承诺来保持石油生产商的友好。大国根据什么标准对石油国家进行排名？我们如何概念化不同类型的石油路线？在每种石油联盟类型下，大国和石油生产商究竟交换了什么？我假设市场力量和地缘战略位置的组合决定了单个石油客户国的战略价值和脆弱性，然后产生了四种相应类型的石油联盟——安全保证、战略联盟、战略支持和忽视。两个精心挑选的案例比较——1970-91 年的沙特阿拉伯和科威特，以及 1990-2013 年的阿塞拜疆和厄瓜多尔——展示了大国如何在石油市场的独特逻辑和不同的地缘政治环境下创造、利用和维持石油联盟。研究结果对大国的大战略、石油国家的战略行为以及石油在国际安全中的作用具有重要意义。