Abstract This manuscript examines how battlefield events influence belligerents’ pursuit of negotiated settlements in civil wars. We argue that successive stalemates are most likely to precipitate rebel demands for negotiations because they offer groups both the opportunity and willingness to push for a compromise settlement. Unlike rebel losses, stalemated battles demonstrate that rebels can offer military resistance to the state. Yet, unlike rebel battle gains, draws do not raise the prospects of a rebel war victory. Using monthly data on rebel demands for negotiations and battle outcomes for 63 African dyads fighting between 1997 and 2010, we find support for this argument; more battlefield stalemates decrease the time until a proposal to negotiate by rebels. Additionally, we examine whether the same battlefield dynamics explain the onset of formal negotiations. The results reveal only a relationship between rebel battle gains and the onset of talks. The contrast in these findings suggests that rebels and governments may conceive of battlefield outcomes, especially stalemates, differently. Although rebels perceive a window of opportunity from a battlefield deadlock, governments appear to be influenced most by rebel gains.

中文翻译：

---

内战中的战斗僵局和叛军谈判尝试

摘要 这份手稿考察了战场事件如何影响交战方在内战中寻求谈判解决的过程。我们认为，连续的僵局最有可能促使反叛者要求谈判，因为它们为团体提供了推动妥协解决方案的机会和意愿。与叛军的损失不同，僵持的战斗表明叛军可以对国家进行军事抵抗。然而，与叛军的战斗收益不同，平局不会提高叛军战争胜利的可能性。使用 1997 年至 2010 年间 63 个非洲二元组战斗的反叛者对谈判的要求和战斗结果的月度数据，我们找到了对这一论点的支持；更多的战场僵局减少了叛军提出谈判建议的时间。此外，我们研究了相同的战场动态是否可以解释正式谈判的开始。结果只揭示了叛军战斗胜利与谈判开始之间的关系。这些发现的对比表明，叛军和政府可能会以不同的方式看待战场结果，尤其是僵局。尽管叛军从战场僵局中看到了机会之窗，但政府似乎最受叛军所得的影响。