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Collaborative environmental management for transboundary air pollution problems: A differential levies game
Journal of Industrial and Management Optimization ( IF 1.3 ) Pub Date : 2019-10-28 , DOI: 10.3934/jimo.2019121
David W. K. Yeung , , Yingxuan Zhang , Hongtao Bai , Sardar M. N. Islam , , , ,

This paper develops a new cooperative dynamic time consistent model for studying regional air pollution management issues in a cooperative game framework for formulating pollution control policies and dynamically consistent compensation mechanisms. As air pollution is a transboundary issue, unilateral response on the part of one region is generally ineffective. Regional cooperation is essential to resolve serious environmental problems. In addition, the long-term environmental impacts are closely related to the building up existing air pollution stocks in Sulfur Dioxide (SO2), Nitrogen Dioxide (NO2), Respirable suspended particulates (RSP) and Ozone (O3). A cooperative dynamic game with different types of pollutants is developed. We characterize the non-cooperative outcomes, and examine the cooperative arrangements, group optimal actions, and individually rational imputations. In particular, an air pollution levy consisting of four components involving damage charges on emissions of sulfur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide, respirable suspended particulates and ozone depletion materials. Cooperative games offer the possibility of socially optimal and group efficient solutions to the lack of cooperation among different regions involving decision problems among strategic actors. This paper makes a valuable contribution to the literature as this is the first cooperative dynamic time consistent model for regional management of different types of air pollutants.

中文翻译:

跨境空气污染问题的协同环境管理:差异征税博弈

本文建立了一个新的合作动态时间一致模型,用于在制定污染控制政策和动态一致补偿机制的合作博弈框架中研究区域空气污染管理问题。由于空气污染是一个跨界问题,因此一个地区的单方面应对通常是无效的。区域合作对于解决严重的环境问题至关重要。此外,长期的环境影响与建立现有的二氧化硫(SO2),二氧化氮(NO2),可吸入悬浮颗粒物(RSP)和臭氧(O3)中的空气污染存量密切相关。开发了一种具有不同污染物类型的合作动态博弈。我们描述非合作结果的特征,并检查合作安排,小组最佳行动,和个别理性的推定。尤其是,空气污染税由四部分组成,涉及对二氧化硫,二氧化氮,可吸入悬浮颗粒物和臭氧消耗物质的排放收取损害赔偿费。合作博弈提供了针对战略参与者之间决策问题的不同区域之间缺乏合作的社会最优和群体有效解决方案的可能性。本文为文献做出了宝贵的贡献,因为这是用于不同类型空气污染物区域管理的第一个合作动态时间一致模型。合作博弈提供了针对战略参与者之间决策问题的不同区域之间缺乏合作的社会最优和群体有效解决方案的可能性。本文为文献做出了宝贵的贡献,因为这是用于不同类型空气污染物区域管理的第一个合作动态时间一致模型。合作博弈提供了针对战略参与者之间决策问题的不同区域之间缺乏合作的社会最优和群体有效解决方案的可能性。本文为文献做出了宝贵的贡献,因为这是用于不同类型空气污染物区域管理的第一个合作动态时间一致模型。
更新日期:2019-10-28
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