ABSTRACT

The rapid increase of negotiated out of court settlements in corporate crime cases has attracted significant academic attention. How the terms of settlements are constructed, however, remains under-studied. To address this gap, the paper observes that the terms of settlements often include a basket of allegations widely spread across time and geography. The paper conceptualises this as a form of ‘bundling’. The paper empirically explores the unique dynamics of corporate bribery cases that enable prosecutors to engage in bundling, and deconstructs bundling into two typologies (allegation bundling and enforcement bundling). From this perspective, this paper analyses official enforcement documentation relating to international bribery cases, supplemented with data from interviews with key informants who have experience of settlement negotiations in the US, the UK, and other countries. The analysis reveals that bundling provides efficiencies when resolving corporate crime cases, offers discounts to corporate defenders, and incentivizes coordinated multilateral enforcement. The practice of bundling allegations and enforcers confirms the character of negotiated settlements as a symbolic criminal law tool designed to reform the accused corporation through negotiation, persuasion and compliance.

摘要

公司犯罪案件庭外和解的迅速增加引起了学术界的广泛关注。然而，定居点的条款是如何构建的，仍然没有得到充分研究。为了弥补这一差距，该论文指出，和解条款通常包括一系列广泛分布于时间和地域的指控。该论文将其概念化为一种“捆绑”形式。本文实证探讨了公司贿赂案件的独特动态，使检察官能够参与捆绑，并将捆绑解构为两种类型（指控捆绑和执法捆绑）。从这个角度，本文分析了与国际贿赂案件相关的官方执法文件，补充了对在美国、英国和其他国家有和解谈判经验的关键知情人的访谈数据。分析表明，捆绑可以提高解决公司犯罪案件的效率，为公司辩护人提供折扣，并激励协调的多边执法。将指控和执法者捆绑在一起的做法证实了协商解决作为一种象征性的刑法工具的特征，旨在通过谈判、说服和遵守来改革被指控的公司。