Abstract

After the Fukushima nuclear meltdown, the Angela Merkel government in Germany officially announced its decision to permanently shut down all of its seventeen nuclear reactors. In closer proximity to Fukushima, the Lee Myung-bak government in South Korea expanded its nuclear energy program with specific plans to construct more nuclear reactors in various locations and pursued more export opportunities. It was only in 2017 that the South Korean government, under President Moon Jae-in, announced a gradual phase-out of nuclear power plants in South Korea. What explains the contrasting paths of the German and South Korean nuclear energy programs in the immediate aftermath of the Fukushima nuclear disaster? Why did the same external shock prompt sudden policy reversal in Germany while it took six more years for South Korea to turn its course? While existing studies are helpful in accounting for the rise of particular energy policies, they are insufficient for explaining the causes and specific timing of major policy reversals in the face of external crises. Building upon the literature on political opportunity structures, this article argues that the emergence of new political opportunities and the shift in political framing with respect to nuclear energy caused nuclear phase-out in both countries. A closer look at the two national cases offers an opportunity to delineate the domestic political process of nuclear energy policymaking and evaluate the role of exogenous shocks, such as a major nuclear disaster, in shifting political opportunity structure and reshaping the perceptions of energy security and political risks.

摘要

福岛核事故发生后，德国安格拉·默克尔政府正式宣布决定永久关闭其所有 17 座核反应堆。在靠近福岛的地方，韩国李明博政府扩大了其核能计划，具体计划在不同地点建造更多核反应堆，并寻求更多出口机会。直到 2017 年，文在寅总统领导下的韩国政府才宣布逐步淘汰韩国的核电站。什么解释了福岛核灾难后德国和韩国核能计划的对比路径？为什么同样的外部冲击会导致德国突然政策逆转，而韩国却又花了六年时间才改变方向？虽然现有研究有助于解释特定能源政策的兴起，但它们不足以解释面对外部危机时重大政策逆转的原因和具体时间。本文基于有关政治机会结构的文献，认为新政治机会的出现和核能政治框架的转变导致两国逐步淘汰核能。